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INTRODUCTION 
Reconciling the conflict between the doctrine of entire fairness1 
and the summary process contained in Delaware’s short-form merger 
statute,2 the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in Glassman v. Unocal 
Exploration Corp.3 that a majority shareholder need not establish 
entire fairness in a short-form merger.4 Instead, majority shareholders 
can freeze out minority shareholders by simply paying them for the 
“fair value” of their shares.5 Under Delaware’s new doctrine, a 
dissatisfied shareholder’s only recourse, absent fraud or illegality, is 
appraisal.6 
A short-form merger occurs when a parent corporation combines 
with a 90 percent owned subsidiary.7 Delaware offers a statutory 
summary procedure for such mergers. Under Delaware’s short-form 
merger statute, a parent who owns at least 90 percent “of the 
outstanding shares of each class of [a subsidiary corporation’s] stock” 
may merge the subsidiary corporation into itself, or alternatively, may 
 
Copyright © 2004 by Richard T. Hossfeld. 
 1. Entire fairness is a standard that majority shareholders must satisfy in self-interested 
transactions, such as merger freeze-outs. Entire fairness involves two components: fair dealing 
and fair price. Essentially, both the mechanics of the transaction and the buyout price must be 
fair to minority shareholders. For a complete discussion of entire fairness, see infra Part I.B. 
 2. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2001). A short-form merger is one where the majority 
shareholder(s) owns at least 90 percent “of the outstanding shares of each class of the 
[corporation’s] stock” and eliminates the minority shareholders using a statutory summary 
process. Id. § 253(a). 
 3. 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2000). 
 4. Id. at 248. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 243. 
 7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a). 
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merge both itself and the subsidiary corporation into a third 
corporation.8 To effectuate such a merger, a parent’s board of 
directors simply approves a resolution and files the resolution with 
the Delaware secretary of state.9 The parent’s stockholders, the 
subsidiary’s board, and the subsidiary’s stockholders do not play any 
role in approving the merger or in negotiating the merger price. 
In a traditional merger, shareholders of the acquired corporation 
are entitled to “adequate consideration for their stock.”10 Assuring 
shareholders adequate consideration are “[t]he traditional legal 
safeguards”: shareholder approval and statutory appraisal.11 
Generally, shareholders must approve mergers.12 Appraisal then 
guarantees dissenting shareholders the opportunity to seek a fair 
price for their shares through a judicial process. Common law 
fiduciary duties also provide protection.13  
However, none of these traditional safeguards adequately 
protect minority shareholders when the majority freezes them out in a 
short-form merger. First, shareholder approval is ineffective because, 
by definition, the parent holds sufficient votes to approve the merger 
without any minority support.14 Even if a merger’s approval required 
a majority of the minority vote, dissatisfied shareholders would only 
have “the limited option of rejecting the merger,” as minority 
shareholders rarely participate in merger negotiations.15 Second, 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. The board resolution shall provide the “terms and conditions of the merger, including 
the securities, cash, property, or rights to be issued, paid, delivered or granted by the surviving 
corporation” to the subsidiary. Id. Along with the board resolution, the parent must also file a 
certificate showing 90 percent ownership of the subsidiary. Id.  
 10. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Fair Value and Fair Price in Corporate Acquisitions, 78 
N.C. L. REV. 101, 102 (1999). 
 11. Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and 
Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 299 (1974). 
 12. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c). 
 13. Campbell, supra note 10, at 102; see John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the 
Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware Law Encourage Efficient Transactions while Chilling 
Inefficient Ones?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 359, 423 (1996) (“[T]he principal purpose of fiduciary 
duties has long been to constrain opportunism by management and controlling shareholders.”). 
The three common law fiduciary duties are the duty of good faith, the duty of loyalty, and the 
duty of due care. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Del. 1995). For a 
description of the common law fiduciary duties, see infra notes 26−30 and accompanying text. 
 14. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 11, at 299–300. 
 15. Id. at 300. A majority of the minority vote requires the corporation to obtain a majority 
of support from the minority shareholders before it can proceed with a transaction. Id. 
However, majority shareholders would likely involve minority shareholders in merger 
negotiations when the minority shareholders could veto the merger. 
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researchers label appraisal “a remedy of desperation” and describe it 
as “technical . . . expensive . . . uncertain . . . and . . . unlikely to 
produce a better result than could have been obtained on the 
market.”16 Unsurprisingly, few shareholders seek appraisal even 
though they might be dissatisfied with the consideration their parent 
pays them in a freeze-out merger.17 
Despite appraisal’s ineffectiveness, shareholders lack any other 
means to fight majority overreaching in a short-form merger.18 
Though Delaware “launched the modern movement toward greater 
reliance on appraisal as a check against majority self-dealing”19 in 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,20 it has yet to specify an adequate appraisal 
remedy for protecting frozen-out shareholders.21 As such, if Delaware 
wants appraisal to remain a minority stockholder’s exclusive remedy 
in a short-form merger, it should modify appraisal to protect the 
minority stockholder. 
Instead of merely paying minority shareholders the “fair value” 
of their shares, appraisal should seek a Pareto optimal outcome and 
fully compensate minority shareholders while reducing merger 
transaction costs. In general, a Pareto optimal outcome exists where it 
is impossible to make any party better off without harming someone 
else.22 Applying Pareto concepts to appraisal reform reveals that 
Delaware can reduce appraisal’s transaction costsbenefiting 
minority shareholders by giving them a realistic remedy and greater 
compensationwithout injuring majority shareholders. Currently, 
appraisal’s high transaction costs harm both minority and majority 
shareholders. Minority shareholders lack an adequate remedy in a 
 
 16. Id. at 304 (quoting Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and 
Management in Modern Corporate Decision Making, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1, 85 (1969)). 
 17. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, Shareholder Litigation: Reexamining the 
Balance Between Litigation Agency Costs and Management Agency Costs, 28 (Sept. 4, 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal); see Coffee, supra note 13, at 364 
(“[A]ppraisal proceedings are an unwieldy remedy that smaller shareholders infrequently 
elect . . . .”). 
 18. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 19. Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate 
Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 43 (1995). 
 20. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 21. See Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts 
Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 616 (1998) (“Weinberger apparently was intended to 
revamp the appraisal remedy so that shareholder challenges to merger transactions would be 
efficiently resolved in an appraisal proceeding, rather than some other form of legal challenge to 
the transaction.”). 
 22. ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 559 (1997). 
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freeze-out and, as a result, majority shareholders pay a higher cost of 
capital through the minority discount.23 Appraisal reform could lower 
the parent corporation’s cost of capital if minority shareholders feel 
more secure in their holdings and, through efficient markets, bargain 
away the traditional minority discount.24 
Part I of this Note outlines Delaware merger freeze-out law. It 
first provides a general description of the relevant merger law, before 
turning to entire fairness and appraisal. Part I gives a detailed account 
of the procedural and valuation aspects of entire fairness review and 
appraisal. Next, Part II examines the result of the Glassman holding, 
which leaves appraisal as the exclusive remedy for dissatisfied 
minority shareholders in a short-form merger. Although appraisal is 
an adequate remedy substantively because of the similar valuation 
techniques that appraisal and entire fairness employ, this Note argues 
that appraisal is procedurally flawed. These procedural flaws reduce 
shareholder liquidity and render minority shareholders vulnerable to 
majority opportunism—two harms that appraisal is charged with 
mitigating. As such, Part III provides a brief discussion of efficient 
markets to show how minority shareholders discount the purchase 
price of their shares to reflect the risks of illiquidity and majority 
overreaching. Applying Pareto concepts, Part IV proposes both 
procedural and valuation modifications to the appraisal remedy that 
will provide shareholders with additional liquidity and greater 
protection against majority overreaching. 
I.  DELAWARE FREEZE-OUT LAW 
A. Overview of Delaware Merger Law 
Corporations operate as democratic organizations and are 
generally subject to majority-rule governance.25 Mitigating the 
inherent supremacy that majority shareholders have over minority 
shareholders are the majority’s fiduciary obligations to both the 
parent’s minority shareholders and the shareholders of any subsidiary 
 
 23. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 458 (5th ed. 1998) 
(recognizing that minority shareholders who are vulnerable to a freeze-out merger will demand 
extra compensation for the risk of their investment). 
 24. Stock trades in the open market at the minority discount price, which incorporates an 
offset for the value of holding corporate control. See infra Part III. 
 25. Wertheimer, supra note 21, at 613. Many states, however, require supermajority 
governance when undertaking fundamental corporate acts. F. HODGE O’NEAL, EXPULSION OR 
OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES: “SQUEEZE-OUTS” IN SMALL ENTERPRISES 5 (1961). 
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corporation.26 Regardless of the relative size of each constituency, 
majority shareholders “owe the same duty of good management” to 
both the parent and subsidiary.27 Serving in both capacities does not 
dilute a parent’s fiduciary obligations to its subsidiary.28 
Three fiduciary obligations police the parent-minority 
shareholder relationship: the duty of good faith, the duty of loyalty, 
and the duty of due care.29 Shareholders may, in their individual 
capacities, bring derivative suits or class actions against managers 
alleging breach of one of the triad of fiduciary duties.30 In a fiduciary 
claim, the deferential business judgment rule has served historically as 
both a procedural and substantive guide for litigants, assigning one 
party the burden of proof and then determining the relevant legal 
standard.31 The business judgment rule presumes “that in making a 
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed 
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was 
in the best interests of the company.”32 Courts will not second-guess a 
 
 26. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976 (Del. 1977) (“Development, as the 
majority stockholder of Magnavox, owed to the minority stockholders of that corporation, a 
fiduciary obligation . . . .”), rev’d on other grounds, 380 A.2d 969 (1977). Similarly, a majority 
shareholder who “exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation” owes 
shareholders a fiduciary obligation. Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 
1113 (Del. 1994) (quoting Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 
(Del. 1987)) (emphasis added by Kahn). 
 27. Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1106 (Del. 1985) (quoting 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1981)); see also A.C. Pritchard, Tender Offers 
by Controlling Shareholders: The Specter of Coercion and Fair Price, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 4, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“The general rule, 
long established in Delaware and elsewhere, is that controlling shareholders owe a fiduciary 
duty to the corporation and minority shareholders.”). 
 28. Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1106 (citing Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 261 A.2d 911, 915 (Del. 
Ch. 1969)). 
 29. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Del. 1995). Historically, only 
the duties of loyalty and due care oversaw the parent-minority shareholder relationship. A 1986 
amendment to Delaware’s General Corporation Law, however, suggested that directors also 
owe shareholders a duty of good faith. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) 
(prohibiting a corporation from limiting a director’s liability in its certificate of incorporation 
“for acts or omissions not in good faith”). Cinerama confirmed that directors owe shareholders 
all three duties. 663 A.2d at 1164. Even so, directors that violate the duty of good faith are likely 
also acting disloyal or not exercising due care. 
 30. Peter V. Letsou, The Role of Appraisal in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 1121, 1157 
(1998). 
 31. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1162. 
 32. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Delaware’s General Corporation Law 
expresses the business judgment rule as: “The business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall 
be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
141. 
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board decision unless the plaintiff can rebut one of these business 
judgment rule presumptions.33 
In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., however, the court removed the 
business judgment rule from consideration when a controlling 
shareholder stands on both sides of a transaction. Instead, such a 
transaction is subject to “entire fairness” review.34 By implementing 
an entire fairness review of a parent-subsidiary merger, the 
Weinberger court necessarily created a conflict with Delaware’s 
existing short-form merger statute.35 Specifically, Weinberger’s entire 
fairness requires fair dealing for a freeze-out merger, but Delaware’s 
short-form merger statute does not require any dealing whatsoever 
on the part of the parent. The Delaware Supreme Court resolved this 
conflict in Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp. by exempting short-
form mergers from entire fairness review. In doing so, the court held 
that appraisal is the exclusive remedy for dissatisfied stockholders, 
absent fraud or illegality.36 
B. Entire Fairness Review 
Entire fairness review stems from the duty of loyalty, which 
applies primarily in situations where one party to a transaction could 
engage in self-dealing.37 Although a corporation’s board is generally 
charged with maximizing shareholder wealth, the board might fail to 
maximize shareholder wealth when the interests of the majority 
shareholders, who control the board, and the minority shareholders 
conflict.38 Consequently, the duty of loyalty and resulting entire 
fairness review protect minority shareholders from majority 
 
 33. Bradley R. Aronstam et al., Delaware’s Going-Private Dilemma: Fostering Protections 
for Minority Shareholders in the Wake of Siliconix and Unocal Exploration, 58 BUS. LAW. 519, 
522−23 (2003). 
 34. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); accord Kahn v. Lynch 
Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994). In Weinberger, the court removed 
the business judgment rule because the rule did not provide minority shareholders any 
additional protection given the new entire fairness standard, “the expanded appraisal remedy,” 
and “the broad discretion of the Chancellor to fashion” other relief. 457 A.2d at 715. 
 35. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 247 (Del. 2000). 
 36. Id. at 248. 
 37. William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in 
Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 862 (2001). 
 38. See id. at 875 (“[W]here a majority have personal interests in the transaction that are 
adverse to the interest of the shareholders, it cannot be presumed that the board will be 
motivated to achieve the highest transaction price the market will permit.”). 
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shareholders who “could unilaterally implement transactions to the 
detriment of minority shareholders.”39 
Entire fairness review is Delaware’s most rigorous standard of 
review.40 It requires majority shareholders to establish that they dealt 
fairly with the minority shareholders and paid a fair price for the 
minority shares: 
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair 
price. . . . [T]he test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between 
fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must be examined as a 
whole since the question is one of entire fairness. However, in a non-
fraudulent transaction we recognize that price may be the 
preponderant consideration outweighing other features of the 
merger.41 
First, fair dealing “embraces questions of when the transaction 
was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to 
the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the 
stockholders were obtained.”42 Although fair dealing clearly requires 
a parent to act “free of fraud or misrepresentation,” a parent must do 
more than just avoid deception to achieve fair dealing.43 The parent 
must also “disclose[] all information in [its] possession germane to the 
transaction in issue. . . . such as a reasonable shareholder would 
consider important in deciding whether to sell or retain stock.”44 For 
example, in Weinberger, the court found important both an internal 
memorandum discussing merger synergies45 and a report stating that 
the freeze-out would be a good investment up to $24 per share 
 
 39. Aronstam et al., supra note 33, at 520. Entire fairness also ensures minority 
shareholders a fair valuation of their shares, given “the difficulty of ascertaining, in non-arms-
length transactions, the price at which the deal would have been effected in the market.” Allen 
et al., supra note 37, at 876. 
 40. See Aronstam et al., supra note 33, at 523 (“The entire fairness test has been 
consistently referred to as the most exacting standard of review utilized by Delaware courts.”); 
Pritchard, supra note 27, at 2 (“[T]he ‘entire fairness’ standard [is] the most demanding regime 
in corporate law.”); see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 
1989) (describing entire fairness review as “rigorous judicial scrutiny under . . . exacting 
standards”). 
 41. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). Note that “where corporate 
action has been approved by an informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders . . . the 
burden entirely shifts to the plaintiff to show that the transaction was unfair to the minority.” Id. 
at 703. 
 42. Id. at 711. 
 43. Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1104–05 (Del. 1985). 
 44. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710. 
 45. Id. at 708. 
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(instead of the offered $21 per share).46 As such, the court held that 
the parent did not satisfy the fair dealing prong of entire fairness.47 
Second, a transaction must satisfy the fair price element of entire 
fairness. In Weinberger, the court rejected the traditional “Delaware 
block” method of valuing shares48 and instead crafted a more flexible 
approach modeled after valuation in an appraisal proceeding.49 Under 
the court’s new approach to calculating fair price, a parent must 
consider “all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future 
prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent 
value of a company’s stock.”50 Only “speculative elements” can be 
excluded from the fair price calculation.51 
The new bifurcated fairness standard established in Weinberger 
set the stage for a conflict between the “fair dealing” component of 
entire fairness and the summary merger procedure in Delaware’s 
short-form merger statute. Under Delaware’s statute, the majority 
and minority shareholders do not negotiate a merger agreement, 
minority shareholders receive no advance notice, and shareholders do 
not vote.52 The court resolved the conflict in Glassman. Looking to 
the legislative intent behind the short-form merger statute, the court 
concluded that a standard of entire fairness would thwart the 
legislature’s goal of establishing a quick freeze-out process for parents 
who hold at least 90 percent of a subsidiary.53 Therefore, mergers 
under Delaware’s short-form merger statute need not satisfy entire 
fairness. Instead, a frozen-out shareholder can only check majority 
overreaching through the state’s default appraisal remedy. 
 
 46. Id. at 712. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Under the Delaware block method, a court assigns weights to a company’s “net asset 
value, market price, earnings, and other factors . . . based on the trial court’s intuitive 
judgment.” Leo Herzel & Dale E. Colling, Establishing Procedural Fairness in Squeeze-Out 
Mergers After Weinberger v. UOP, 39 BUS. LAW. 1525, 1529 (1984). In Weinberger, the court 
rejected the Delaware block method, which it had used for decades, because the method did not 
account for “other generally accepted techniques used in the financial community and the 
courts.” 457 A.2d at 712. 
 49. Id. at 712–13. 
 50. Id. at 711. 
 51. Id. at 713. 
 52. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 247 (Del. 2001). 
 53. Id. at 247−48 (“If . . . [the parent] sets up negotiating committees, hires independent . . . 
experts, etc., then it . . . [loses] the very benefit provided by the statute—a simple, fast and 
inexpensive process for accomplishing a merger.”). 
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C. Appraisal 
Appraisal is a statutory remedy by which shareholders who 
dissent to a merger can petition Delaware’s Court of Chancery for a 
determination of the “fair value” of their shares.54 Essentially, 
appraisal provides dissatisfied shareholders with an option to cash-out 
without having to demonstrate “illegality, fraud, bad faith or some 
other breach of fiduciary duty.”55 The concept of appraisal originated 
in the nineteenth century to provide managers with additional 
flexibility.56 At that time, corporate law viewed shareholders as 
holding vested rights in a corporation, and thus a single shareholder 
could veto a merger.57 The growth of American business at the end of 
the nineteenth century, however, required a more flexible approach 
to mergers, and appraisal “facilitat[ed] desirable corporate changes 
[and] provid[ed] liquidity.”58 
Since its introduction, Delaware’s appraisal statute has served 
three main purposes: (1) “facilitating the market for corporate 
control”; (2) “providing liquidity”; and (3) checking majority 
shareholder opportunism.59 Today, appraisal’s most important 
purpose is checking majority shareholder opportunisma function 
previously satisfied by both the concept of fiduciary duty and statutes 
limiting corporate power.60 To check majority opportunism 
effectively, appraisal must provide minority shareholders with 
legitimate access to an adequate price.  
1. Appraisal Procedure. Appraisal “is a limited statutory 
remedy”61 and is available only in certain transactions, one of which is 
a short-form merger.62 In Delaware, qualifying dissatisfied 
 
 54. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2001). 
 55. In re Unocal Exploration Corp. S’holders Litig., 793 A.2d 329, 340 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 56. Id.; Elliott J. Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash-Out Mergers: The Promise of 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 10 (1983). 
 57. Unocal Exploration, 793 A.2d at 339; Wertheimer, supra note 21, at 614–15; see also In 
re Paine v. Saulsbury, 166 N.W. 1036 (1918) (refusing to permit a 99 percent shareholder to 
dissolve a corporation because the 1 percent minority shareholders did not assent to 
dissolution). 
 58. Thompson, supra note 19, at 3. 
 59. Randall S. Thomas, Revising the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3 DEL. L. REV. 1, 16 
(2000). 
 60. Thompson, supra note 19, at 4. 
 61. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 296 (Del. 1996). 
 62. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2001). Appraisal applies without exception in short-
form mergers. Id. § 262(b)(3). However, appraisal is not always available within other categories 
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shareholders must follow a complex set of statutory guidelines to 
perfect their appraisal rights. Each shareholder seeking appraisal 
must comply with these guidelines, making appraisal an “opt-in” 
remedy.63 In contrast, other shareholder remedies, such as entire 
fairness, authorize class action litigationan “opt-out” 
remedywhere shareholders are included in the class unless they 
remove themselves from the litigation.64 
To qualify under Delaware’s appraisal statute, a shareholder 
must first hold the corporation’s stock on the date that the 
shareholder demands appraisal, and then continuously until the 
effective date of the merger or consolidation.65 In a short-form 
merger, the shareholder of record will receive an initial notice about 
the merger and information about the shareholder’s appraisal rights 
either before the merger’s effective date or within ten days 
thereafter.66 After the corporation mails the appraisal notice, the 
dissatisfied stockholder has twenty days to demand appraisal in 
writing from the continuing corporation.67 The demand must 
“reasonably inform[] the corporation of the identity of the 
stockholder and that the stockholder intends thereby to demand the 
appraisal.”68 
After a shareholder demands appraisal, the continuing 
corporation must disclose to the shareholder, upon written request, 
both the number of shareholders demanding appraisal and the 
collective number of shares they hold. The corporation shall mail 
 
of mergers. For example, minority shareholders in a long-form mergera freeze-out merger 
where the controlling stockholder owns at least 50.1 percent of each class of stockface a stock 
market exemption, which denies them appraisal when shares are publicly traded. Id. § 
262(b)(1). 
 63. Andra v. Blount, 772 A.2d 183, 194 (Del. Ch. 2000) (stating that one of the “apparent 
inadequacies of the appraisal remedy [is] that [the shareholder] does not get to represent a 
class”). 
 64. See, e.g., Herzel & Colling, supra note 48, at 1526 (describing the availability of class 
action litigation in an entire fairness complaint). 
 65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a). 
 66. To determine which stockholders receive notice of the merger and their appraisal 
rights, each constituent corporation can set a record date, not more than ten days before mailing 
the notice. Id. § 262(d)(2). However, if the corporation mails such notice on or after the 
merger’s effective date, the record date will be the effective date. Id. Note that the appraisal 
demand procedure is different for mergers subject to a stockholder vote. In such mergers, the 
corporation must provide notice to the shareholders at least twenty days before the meeting, 
and a shareholder must demand appraisal before the vote. Id. § 262(d)(1). To retain appraisal 
rights, the shareholder must not vote for or consent to the merger. Id. § 262(a). 
 67. Id. § 262(d)(2). 
 68. Id. 
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such disclosure within ten days of either receiving the information 
request or concluding the appraisal demand period.69 At the same 
time, either the continuing corporation or a stockholder who 
complied with the appraisal statute can petition the Delaware Court 
of Chancery for a “determination of the value of the stock” within 
120 days of the merger’s effective date.70 However, a shareholder has 
sixty days from the effective date to withdraw from an appraisal 
proceeding and accept the merger terms. Finally, the continuing 
corporation must provide the Chancery Court with a duly verified list 
of the names and addresses of stockholders suing for appraisal.71 
2. Valuation. After perfecting the right to appraisal, a 
shareholder turns to the Court of Chancery for a determination of 
each share’s “fair value.”72 Underlying appraisal is the assumption 
that dissenting shareholders want to retain their investment in the 
corporation and would do so absent the freeze-out.73 As such, an 
appraisal proceeding must award dissenting stockholders the fair 
value of what the freeze-out took from them. The appraisal statute 
does not provide any guidance regarding how to calculate fair value, 
and thus courts have developed a valuation technique out of 
necessity.74 Weinberger confirmed that the underlying inquiry in fair 
value is to determine the stockholder’s “proportionate interest in 
[the] going concern.”75 In valuing the company as a going concern, a 
court must value the corporation as a whole, rather than merely 
calculating the value of the minority stock.76 After establishing the 
corporation’s value, the court then awards a stockholder a sum equal 
to the stockholder’s pro rata share of the corporation. 
 
 69. Id. § 262(e). 
 70. Id. The stockholder must also serve notice of the appraisal petition on the continuing 
corporation. Id. 
 71. Id. § 262(f). 
 72. Id. § 262(h). 
 73. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996); see also Campbell, 
supra note 10, at 118–19 (“Stockholders invest in anticipation of participating in the value that a 
corporation generates as a going concern.”). 
 74. John C. Coates IV, “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority 
Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1260 (1999). 
 75. Cede, 684 A.2d at 298; Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983). 
 76. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989); see also Cede, 684 A.2d 
at 298 (“The dissenting shareholder’s proportionate interest is determined only after the 
company has been valued as an operating entity on the date of the merger.”). 
071604 HOSSFELD.DOC 9/17/2004  2:03 PM 
1348 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1337 
When determining the fair value of the going concern, a court 
should consider: “all factors and elements which reasonably might 
enter into the fixing of value. . . . [including] market value, asset 
value, dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise, and 
any other facts.”77 Within this formula, fair value must also consider 
externalities that might have depressed the current market, cyclical 
earning cycles, and whether management timed the freeze-out in 
anticipation of a positive development. Appraisal only excludes 
“speculative elements of value,” but this is “a very narrow exception,” 
and not meant to exclude statistical techniques as a method of 
proving future value.78 Nevertheless, fair value does not include any 
synergy or gain the corporation expects from the merger.79 
D. Majority Stockholder’s Duty to Disclose 
Although a parent may conduct a short-form merger without 
following the procedures that satisfy entire fairness, it must still 
satisfy the duty of full disclosure.80 After a parent commences a short-
form merger, minority shareholders are left with two options: accept 
the merger terms and accompanying price for their holdings, or file an 
appraisal action. To facilitate this decision, the majority shareholder 
must provide minority shareholders with “all the factual information 
that is material to that decision.”81 A given fact is material, and thus 
must be disclosed, if there is “a substantial likelihood that the 
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the 
reasonable stockholder as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ 
of information made available.”82 
 
 77. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713 (quoting Tri-Cont’l Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 
1950)). 
 78. Id. 
 79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2001). 
 80. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001); Skeen v. Jo-Ann 
Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1171 (Del. 2000). 
 81. Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248. 
 82. Skeen, 750 A.2d at 1172 (quoting Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 
135, 142 (Del. 1997)). In disclosing all material information, the majority shareholder must 
“communicate honestly,” and “comply[] with their ever-present duties of due care, good faith 
and loyalty.” In re Siliconix Inc., S’holders Litig., No. 18700, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83, at *36 
(June 19, 2001). 
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For example, a large difference in the merger price and a stock’s 
book price provides new information and is material.83 However, 
unless significantly different from previously disclosed information, 
courts have not required the disclosure of management performance 
projections, more recent financial statements, or the prices a 
corporation discussed for its possible sale.84 Such information might 
be “helpful” to stockholders, but is not material.85 Majority 
shareholders who violate their duty to disclose expose themselves to 
an action for the breach of their fiduciary duties.86 
II.  AN EXCLUSIVE REMEDY 
When Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp. ended entire 
fairness review of short-form mergers, it left appraisal as the sole 
safeguard against majority opportunism.87 One reason for elevating 
appraisal was to facilitate the market for corporate controlthe first 
of appraisal’s three purposesin the context of efficient short-form 
mergers.88 Nevertheless, because appraisal is now a minority 
shareholder’s sole remedy in a short-form merger, it is critical that 
appraisal both provides minority shareholders with legitimate access 
to an adequate price and checks majority opportunism. Without such 
access and protection, majority shareholders could freeze out 
minority shareholders for minimal consideration, leaving injured 
shareholders without a remedy at law. 
Generally, entire fairness provides a better remedy for 
dissatisfied minority shareholders than appraisal. The differences 
between the two remedies highlight appraisal’s inadequacy as a 
protection against majority opportunism. If appraisal were adequate, 
courts or the legislature would have extended its exclusivity to other 
transactions, such as long-form mergers.89 However, by developing 
 
 83. See Seagraves v. Urstadt Prop. Co., No. 10307, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 155, at *15 (Dec. 
4, 1989) (suggesting that a disparity between the merger price of $12.50 and book value of 
$25.00 would be material, even though a $3.00 difference would not be). 
 84. Skeen, 750 A.2d at 1173. 
 85. Id. at 1174. 
 86. E.g., Seagraves, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 155, at *13. 
 87. Neither shareholder approval nor common law fiduciary duties adequately protect 
minority shareholders. For a discussion of the legal safeguards that protect minority 
shareholders from majority opportunism, see supra notes 11−17 and accompanying text. 
 88. See Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001) (recognizing 
that the short-form merger statute provides “a simple, fast and inexpensive process for 
accomplishing a merger”). 
 89. Aronstam et al., supra note 33, at 551. 
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two standards of protectionappraisal for short-form mergers and 
entire fairness review with appraisal for long-form mergersthe 
Delaware courts and legislature recognize that it is not appropriate to 
rely solely on appraisal in all situations. This Part first argues that in 
the context of short-form mergers, appraisal and entire fairness are 
substantively identical. Section B then demonstrates that, despite the 
substantive similarities between the two remedies, their procedural 
differences render appraisal an inadequate protection against 
majority opportunism. 
A. Appraisal as an Exclusive Remedy in a Short-Form Merger 
Appraisal should be the exclusive remedy for dissatisfied 
shareholders in a short-form merger because it facilitates the market 
for corporate control. Because the Delaware legislature created a 
summary process for short-form mergerseliminating procedures 
that a board must follow in other transactionsquestions embraced 
by the fair dealing inquiry of entire fairness are irrelevant. 
Dissatisfied minority shareholders in a short-form merger only 
complain about price. As such, appraisal will serve as the substantive 
equivalent of entire fairness review if it provides minority 
shareholders with the same payout.90 In other words, fair value in 
appraisal must equal fair price in entire fairness. 
Even though appraisal calculates the “fair value” of minority 
shares and entire fairness examines “fair price,” the two procedures 
employ similar valuation techniques.91 Both evaluate the firm as “a 
going concern,” and both utilize a similar laundry list of relevant 
financial considerations.92 In addition, Delaware courts often consult 
 
 90. See In re Unocal Exploration Corp. S’holders Litig., 793 A.2d 329, 338 (Del. Ch. 2000) 
(“Put simply, long-form and short-form mergers should be subject to a different set of rules 
because one form of transaction requires the subsidiary board’s participation and assent while 
the other does not.”), aff’d, Glassman, 777 A.2d 242. 
 91. Rabkin v. Olin Corp., C.A. No. 7547, 1990 WL 47648, at *12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1990); 
Andrew G.T. Moore, The ‘Interested’ Director of Officer Transaction, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 674, 
676 (1979); Lucian A. Bebchuck & Marcel Kahan, The “Lemons Effect” in Corporate Freeze-
Outs 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6938, 1999). But see Campbell, 
supra note 10, at 111 (“Courts generally have determined that the measure of fair price is 
different from the measure of fair value.”). 
 92. “[Fair price] include[s] all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future 
prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s 
stock.” Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). “[V]alue under the appraisal 
statute” is “the true or intrinsic value of his stock. . . . [which factors in] market value, asset 
value, dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any other facts . . .” Id. at 
713 (quoting Tri-Cont’l Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950)). 
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appraisal cases when deciding whether a price is fair, reasoning that a 
fair value in appraisal will be a fair price in entire fairness.93 The 
major difference between entire fairness and appraisal is that entire 
fairness can award rescissory damages.94 In contrast, undoing a short-
form merger is rarely appropriate, and misconduct supporting such a 
remedy in a short-form merger would likely open up a fiduciary duty 
claim, for which rescissory damages are also available.95 
Establishing appraisal as an exclusive remedy would also benefit 
majority shareholders by providing an inexpensive procedure for 
eliminating minority shareholders.96 Appraisal litigation is less 
expensive than other forms of litigation challenging mergers, such as 
entire fairness.97 Benefiting controlling shareholders alone, however, 
is not a sufficient justification for making appraisal exclusive because 
the controlling shareholder decides whether to undertake the 
transaction. Nevertheless, because appraisal yields the same payout as 
entire fairness, the minority shareholder, while not better off, is not 
worse off under an exclusive appraisal approach. Therefore, 
exclusivity will increase social value by lowering transaction costs 
while compensating the minority shareholders under the same 
scheme. 
 
 93. See, e.g., Ala. By-Prods. Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 258 n.1 (Del. 1991) (“If a 
particular merger price would not be ‘entirely fair’ in an equitable action claiming breach of 
fiduciary duty, no different result should obtain in an appraisal, where the issue is whether that 
identical merger price constitutes ‘fair value.’” (quoting Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., No. 
CIV.A.7499, 1989 WL 17438, at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 1989))); Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 
A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989) (“The fairness concept has been said to implicate two 
considerations: fair dealing and fair price.”); Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 
(Del. 1987) (stating that in an entire fairness case, the concept of fair price “flows from” the 
requirements of Delaware’s appraisal statute). 
 94. Compare Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993) (“The 
Chancellor may incorporate elements of rescissory damages into his determination of fair price, 
if he considers such elements: (1) susceptible to proof; and (2) appropriate under the 
circumstances.”), with Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Del. 1962) (“[I]t is 
difficult to imagine a case under the short [-form] merger statute in which there could be such 
actual fraud as would entitle a minority to set aside the merger.”). 
 95. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714: 
The appraisal remedy we approve may not be adequate in certain cases, particularly 
where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or 
gross and palpable overreaching are involved. Under such circumstances, the 
Chancellor’s powers are complete to fashion any form of equitable and monetary 
relief as may be appropriate, including rescissory damages. 
(citation omitted). 
 96. Thomas, supra note 59, at 17. 
 97. Id. at 17–18. 
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B. Problems with Abandoning Entire Fairness for Appraisal 
Even though appraisal facilitates the market for corporate 
control in short-form mergers, it must also fulfill its most important 
purposechecking majority shareholder opportunism.98 To check 
majority opportunism effectively, appraisal should provide minority 
shareholders with a “reasonably attractive alternative” to accepting 
the terms of the merger.99 By doing so, the threat of appraisal will 
force majority shareholders to pay a just price for the minority shares. 
In theory, such an appraisal remedy will protect minority 
shareholders from majority overreaching. In practice, however, “the 
appraisal remedy is replete with shortcomings and therefore fails to 
protect adequately minority shareholders from majoritarian abuse.”100 
The procedural differences between entire fairness and appraisal 
illustrate why the current appraisal remedy fails in practice. 
First, entire fairness is an opt-out remedy, while shareholders 
must opt in if they want to seek appraisal. Shareholders usually bring 
fairness claims as a class action.101 Under the class action format, 
named plaintiffs can be “small stockholder[s] who [have] a very slight 
interest in the matter.” Absent the favorable class action treatment, it 
would be uneconomical for such stockholders to challenge the 
transaction.102 The most significant economic incentive for bringing 
these class actions is that a successful plaintiff can petition the court 
for attorneys’ fees and expert witness costs.103 Thus, the class action 
format and resulting cost-savings benefits provide the plaintiffs’ bar 
with an added incentive to accept fairness cases, even when the claim 
presents only minimal damages.104 
In contrast, the opt-in, non-class action structure of an appraisal 
proceeding makes it difficult for owners of a small amount of stock to 
 
 98. Thompson, supra note 19, at 4. 
 99. See Weiss, supra note 56, at 21 (“The argument in favor of making appraisal the 
exclusive remedy holds up, however, only if appraisal presents a dissatisfied minority 
shareholder with a reasonably attractive alternative . . . .”). 
 100. Aronstam et al., supra note 33, at 546. 
 101. Herzel & Colling, supra note 48, at 1526. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Aronstam et al., supra note 33, at 546−47; see also Andra v. Blount, 772 A.2d 183, 194 
(Del. Ch. 2000) (“[T]he appraisal action will not involve a determination that there was a 
fiduciary breach and the concomitant possibility for an award of attorneys’ fees against the 
defendants.”). 
 104. Andra, 772 A.2d at 194. In Andra, Vice Chancellor Strine named the cost-savings 
benefits of class action lawsuits “Litigation Cost Benefits.” Id. 
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challenge a freeze-out valuation.105 Each party to an appraisal 
proceeding bears its own litigation expenses, including both 
attorneys’ fees and expert witness fees.106 Dissatisfied minority 
shareholders must not only offset any gain by such expenses, but must 
also advance large sums to both their attorneys and experts. Without 
the possibility of a successful litigant obtaining any of these cost-
savings benefits, few members of the plaintiffs’ bar would be willing 
to undertake appraisal challenges on a contingency basis.107 Making 
matters worse, few shareholders perfect their appraisal rights, 
reducing the possibility that such claimants will be able to spread the 
extensive cost of litigation over enough appraised shares to justify the 
appraisal proceeding.108 Still, courts do have the ability to spread the 
costs of the proceedingexcluding attorneys’ or expert witness 
feesamong “the parties as the Court deems equitable.”109 
Second, compared to the more generalized nature of a fairness 
claim, appraisal is procedurally complex, requiring that each 
shareholder complete multiple steps to perfect the right to 
appraisal.110 These procedures drag out the average appraisal 
proceeding to 727 days,111 which is critical because dissenting 
shareholders receive no compensation for their shares until after the 
appraisal proceeding concludes.112 Not only must challenging 
shareholders advance fees to lawyers and experts, but they must also 
hold an illiquid claim for almost two years, forgoing investment in 
other promising opportunities that may arise in the interim.113 
 
 105. Coffee, supra note 13, at 364; Herzel & Colling, supra note 48, at 1530. 
 106. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 301 (Del. 1996); Thomas, supra note 59, 
at 15. 
 107. Weiss, supra note 56, at 21–22; see also Andra, 772 A.2d at 194 (recognizing that it is 
“much less attractive” for attorneys to represent a small block of shares in an appraisal 
proceeding than to represent most or all the company’s shareholders in a class action 
proceeding). 
 108. Coffee, supra note 13, at 412; Marc I. Steinberg, Short-Form Mergers in Delaware, 27 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 489, 492 (2002); Thomas, supra note 59, at 27. If a challenging stockholder 
obtains an appraisal award, the court may divide all or a portion of the appraisal expenses, 
including attorney and expert fees, on a pro rata basis against the value of shares entitled to 
appraisal. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(j) (2001). 
 109. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(j). 
 110. Id. § 262(g). For a description of the steps Delaware requires to perfect appraisal, see 
supra Part I.C.1. 
 111. Thomas, supra note 59, at 22. 
 112. Weiss, supra note 56, at 55 n.345. 
 113. See Thomas, supra note 59, at 29 (recognizing that the challenging shareholder’s 
investment is illiquid during an appraisal action); Alexander Khutorsky, Note, Coming in From 
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Additionally, the defendant corporation may argue, and the court 
may hold, that the fair value of the shares is actually less than the 
price the corporation originally offered.114 Even if a challenging 
stockholder receives a favorable appraisal, the court can only 
reimburse the shareholder for the delayed compensation at the legal 
rate of interest.115 There is even uncertainty over whether the interest 
should be calculated as simple or compound, although courts seem to 
be moving toward awarding compound interest.116 Compound interest 
is more likely when the parent did not initially value the shares in 
good faith.117 
III.  MINORITY DISCOUNTS 
The procedural inadequacy of Delaware’s appraisal remedy, 
which leaves shareholders unprotected against the risk of majority 
overreaching, suggests the possibility that minority shareholders 
account for the risk of an unfair freeze-out ex ante, when pricing the 
corporation’s stock.118 The basic premise behind ex ante pricingand 
the consequent “minority discount”is an efficient capital market. In 
 
the Cold: Reforming Shareholders’ Appraisal Rights in Freeze-Out Transactions, 1997 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 133, 149 (“[T]he problems of illiquidity and the time value of money loom large. 
Appraisal statutes generally allow corporations to withhold payment until a determination is 
made by the court, a period which can last a year or more.”). 
 114. Weiss, supra note 56, at 55 n.345. 
 115. Borruso v. Communications Telesystems Int’l, 753 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
 116. See ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 926 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“It is simply not 
credible in today’s financial markets that a person sophisticated enough to perfect his or her 
appraisal rights would be unsophisticated enough to make an investment at simple 
interest . . . .”); Wertheimer, supra note 21, at 710 n.517 (“The award of simple interest penalizes 
dissenting shareholders and does not accord with economic realities.”). Contra Thompson, 
supra note 19, at 41–42 (“Interest payments have become common only in recent years, and 
Delaware still adheres to a standard practice of paying simple rather than compound 
interest . . . .”). 
 117. Borruso, 753 A.2d at 461 (awarding compound interest after “not[ing] that [the 
corporation] did not make a good faith effort to value [the minorities’ stock] in the merger”). 
 118. See Coates, supra note 74, at 1298 (arguing that investors pass costs back to the firm by 
way of an increased cost of capital). 
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such a market, prices will reflect all available information,119 including 
appraisal’s inability to protect minority shareholders.120 
Shares of stock trade at different prices in an efficient market 
depending on whether a particular share belongs to the control or 
minority block.121 In other words, noncontrolling shares are subject to 
a minority discount, “an adjustment downward from some reference 
value,122 reflecting [minority risks].”123 Such premiums are “well 
known and well documented,”124 and the corresponding minority 
discounts can be up to 35 percent or more of the reference value.125 
Professor John Coates examines the source of these control 
premiums (or discounts) in the context of change of control 
transactions and identifies three main components: (1) synergy value, 
(2) pure control value, and (3) expropriation value.126 
Synergy value represents the gain possible from a 
transactionessentially, the amount by which the whole is more 
valuable than the sum of the two parts.127 Synergies derive from 
numerous sources, such as operating economies achieved through the 
elimination of duplicated functions, tax savings, stock market or 
financial benefits,128 and reduced agency costs.129 Recent regulation by 
both the Securities and Exchange Commission and national 
exchanges has rendered these synergy gains even more valuable, as 
 
 119. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 
25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970); see Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market 
Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1240−41 (1990) (“Efficient market 
theory predicts that in a well-developed securities market, publicly available information 
relevant to stock values is so quickly reflected in market prices that, as a general matter, 
investors cannot expect to profit from trading on such information.”). 
 120. Kimble C. Cannon, Augmenting the Duties of Directors to Protect Minority 
Shareholders in the Context of Going-Private Transactions: The Case for Obligating Directors to 
Express a Valuation Opinion in Unilateral Tender Offers after Siliconix, Aquila and Pure 
Resources, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 191, 196−97. 
 121. Coates, supra note 74, at 1262. 
 122. “Reference values include comparable company market value, market value, asset 
value, liquidation value, replacement value, and earnings or going concern value.” Id. at 1263 
n.38. 
 123. Id. at 1263. 
 124. Id. at 1273. 
 125. Id. at 1254. 
 126. Id. at 1274. 
 127. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE 
L.J. 698, 706 (1982). 
 128. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 11, at 308. 
 129. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 127, at 723. 
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corporations save executive time, legal expenses, accounting costs, 
and filing fees by merging or going private.130 
Next, pure control value represents the benefits of holding a 
controlling interest in a corporation under a system of majority-rule 
governance.131 These benefits include “such things as the certainty of 
being able to direct operations, obtain further (potential) synergies, 
freeze out the minority shareholders, and choose the time for payouts 
through dividends, liquidation, or recapitalization.”132 Many of the 
pure control benefits stem from the fact that controlling shareholders 
elect and have influence over the board of directors and, through the 
board, management.133 Given the ability to make corporate decisions 
and the reduced uncertainty that stems from making corporate 
decisions, controlling a corporation is a valuable asset in and of 
itself.134 
Finally, while pure control value involves the legitimate (and 
expected) benefits of control in a majority-rule system, expropriation 
value arises from majority opportunism. The expropriation value of 
the control premium derives from the majority’s “ability to 
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders through fraud, theft, 
or breach of fiduciary duties, such as freeze-outs at a clearly unfair 
price.”135 By failing to provide an adequate remedy for unfair freeze-
outs, appraisal expands the expropriation element of the control 
premium. 
Assuming an efficient market, minority shareholders will return 
the increase in expropriation value to their majority shareholders by 
way of a lower ex ante stock price.136 Such reduced stock prices 
increase the majority’s cost of capital;137 however, firms accept this 
 
 130. Cannon, supra note 120, at 206−12. 
 131. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994) 
(listing examples of the “fundamental corporate changes” that majority shareholders can 
undertake through their power of majority-vote governance). 
 132. Coates, supra note 74, at 1277. 
 133. See Cannon, supra note 120, at 194 (“Controlling shareholders often have significant 
influence over the board of directors as well as over management . . . .”). 
 134. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 
110, 112 (1965) (arguing that “control of corporations may constitute a valuable asset; that this 
asset exists independent of any interest in either economies of scale or monopoly profits; [and] 
that an active market for corporate control exists”). 
 135. Coates, supra note 74, at 1275. 
 136. Id. at 1298. 
 137. Id.; see Cannon, supra note 120, at 196−97 (“This phenomenon will initiate a cycle in 
which the value of the shares in companies controlled by . . . majority shareholders will become 
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cost because of their need for liquidity.138 Although the control 
premium (minority discount) exists in the financial markets, 
Delaware rejects any minority discount analysis when valuing 
shares.139 
IV.  REFORMING APPRAISAL TO ACHIEVE A  
PARETO OPTIMAL OUTCOME 
As currently used in Delaware, the appraisal remedy only 
achieves one of its three goals: it facilitates the market for corporate 
control, but it neither provides minority shareholders adequate 
liquidity nor checks majority shareholder opportunism. Appraisal 
facilitates the market for corporate control by giving majority 
shareholders almost unlimited discretion to freeze out their minority 
counterparts. However, appraisal’s procedural limitations deny 
shareholders liquidity unless they accept a potentially unfair merger 
price. Appraisal’s procedural limitations also permit majority 
shareholder opportunism because few shareholders are able to 
challenge an unfair freeze-out price.140 Given that minority 
shareholders bargain away part of appraisal’s shortcomings through 
the minority discount, majority shareholders share the loss by paying 
a premium when raising capital.141 
Appraisal should be reformed to realign the remedy with its 
traditional goals. When Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp. 
established appraisal as a dissatisfied shareholder’s sole remedy 
following a short-form merger,142 it correctly identified the high value 
of short-form mergers and the need for a quick and inexpensive 
shareholder remedy. However, the court should have appreciated 
appraisal’s current flaws and crafted an alternative appraisal remedy 
modeled off Pareto concepts. Section A sketches out the benefits of 
developing a Pareto remedy for appraisal’s shortcomings. Then, 
Section B proposes specific appraisal reforms that implement the 
theoretical outline of a Pareto optimal appraisal remedy. Section C 
 
ever more depressed due to the perceived risk that minority shareholders will be eliminated at 
an unfair price through a related-party tender offer.”). 
 138. Coates, supra note 74, at 1262 n.35 (acknowledging that commentators have identified 
“other types of discounts relevant to fair value,” including “illiquidity discount[s]”). 
 139. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del. 1989); Coffee, supra note 13, 
at 367; Thomas, supra note 59, at 15. 
 140. See supra Part II.B. 
 141. See supra Part III. 
 142. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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briefly examines valuation, before Section D argues that reforming 
appraisal will not chill efficient mergers. 
A. Pareto Theory of Reforming Appraisal 
In general, a Pareto optimal outcome is an allocation of goods 
where it is impossible to make one person better off (under a 
different allocation) without making at least one other person worse 
off.143 A typical Pareto situation, applied to a short-form merger, is 
diagramed as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The horizontal axis represents the minority shareholders’ ex ante 
share price, the price the minority initially paid for their shares. The 
vertical axis depicts the inadequacy of the appraisal remedy. 
Following the arrows on the axes, minority shareholders will pay less 
for their stock as appraisal becomes increasingly inadequate. 
Correspondingly, majority shareholders receive less money for selling 
stock as appraisal becomes more inadequate because they pay a 
higher cost of capital. 
Realizing that ex ante share price and appraisal’s inadequacy 
have an inverse relationship, both majority and minority shareholders 
 
 143. FRANK, supra note 22, at 559. 
071604 HOSSFELD.DOC 9/17/2004  2:03 PM 
2004] TIME TO REFORM APPRAISAL 1359 
select combinations of the two goods that are advantageous to their 
respective positions. These combinations are called indifference 
curves, and simply represent a sliding scale of the amount each party 
will pay/receive in the initial sale of stock given the adequacy of the 
appraisal remedy. The contract curve represents Pareto optimal 
outcomes, and allocations on the curve are desirable because at these 
points neither party can improve its situation without harming the 
other side. 
Currently, the parent and minority “contract” where their 
indifference curves intersect at Point A. Point A is not Pareto 
optimal. To reach a Pareto preferred or optimal point, the parent, the 
minority, or both must adjust its current indifference curve. By 
employing an externalitya modified Delaware appraisal statute or 
judicial doctrinethe parent and/or minority shareholders can move 
off their indifference curve and contract for a more efficient 
allocation of goods. To be successful, this externality should modify 
the appraisal perfecting process, providing minority shareholders with 
the liquidity and the ability to check majority overreaching that they 
currently lack. Minority shareholders will then remit a portion of 
these benefits to the parent through a smaller minority discountin 
other words, a lower cost of capital.144 
The current Pareto inefficient allocation arose from the holding 
in Glassman. Before Glassman, majority shareholders were uncertain 
about the level of fairness they owed minority shareholders in a short-
form merger. For example, majority shareholders would appoint 
special negotiating committees, bring in outside advisors to simulate 
an arms-length negotiation, and take other steps consistent with a 
regular entire fairness review.145 The court recognized that such 
procedures would be inconsistent with an efficient and inexpensive 
process and granted majority shareholders the right to follow 
Delaware’s statutory summary process.146 In doing so, the court 
benefited the majority, but made the minority position worse by 
removing protections against illiquidity and majority overreaching. 
The Glassman court left minority shareholders with an appraisal 
procedure that delivers the same price as entire fairness and should 
be adequate in theory, but that proves inadequate in practice due to 
 
 144. POSNER, supra note 23, at 458. 
 145. E.g., Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 243 (Del. 2001). 
 146. Id. at 247−48. 
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its numerous procedural disadvantages.147 Similar to a law without 
enforcement, a remedy without access is ineffective.148 
B. Changing the Method of Appraisal 
In order to achieve a Pareto optimal outcome, the procedure for 
seeking appraisal should change. Appraisal reform should “balanc[e] 
the relative dangers of oppression by the majority and harassment by 
the minority.”149 Because appraisal currently fails to check majority 
oppression, any reform should elevate small shareholders to the level 
where appraisal offers them an effective remedy. 
First, Delaware should implement a summary process that 
enables dissatisfied minority shareholders to obtain a judgment 
sooner than the 727-day average that currently scares shareholders 
into accepting merger terms.150 
Second, Delaware’s appraisal law should provide challenging 
shareholders with some liquidity by following the intent of the Model 
Business Corporation Act’s (MBCA) payout provision.151 The MBCA 
payout provision provides that a parent must compensate a minority 
shareholder with what the parent calculates as a “fair value” for the 
minority’s shares within thirty days of receiving the shareholder’s 
demand for appraisal.152 While the MBCA facilitates appraisal actions 
by providing some instant liquidity, it goes too far in protecting 
minority shareholders by awarding a price that might exceed the 
appraised value of the shares. In an appraisal hearing, courts are free 
to appraise shares for less than the merger pricethe price the parent 
initially determined was a fair value. 
To incorporate the benefits of the MBCA provision while 
avoiding its disadvantages, a better approach is to require parents to 
pay challenging shareholders a sum equal to the market price of the 
 
 147. See supra Part II.B. 
 148. See Franco Modigliani & Enrico Perotti, Protection of Minority Interest and the 
Development of Security Markets, 18 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 519, 520 (1997) (“It is 
important to realize that legal rules alone are not sufficient to create a favorable legal 
framework; their proper enforcement is just as important.”). 
 149. James Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder’s Appraisal Right, 77 
HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1216–17 (1964). 
 150. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 151. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.24 (1992). 
 152. Id. Note that the “fair value” price under this provision is not necessarily the same as 
the merger price. Parents have an incentive to pay the merger price, however, because if parents 
regularly paid higher prices, minority shareholders would seldom accept the initial merger price 
but instead hope for a quick settlement at a higher price. 
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shares immediately prior to the merger. While market price is an 
unreliable indicator of value, particularly in the presence of a 
controlling block of stock that lowers trading volume and liquidity,153 
it still provides minority shareholders with some value for their 
shares. Also, courts are unlikely to appraise minority shares for less 
than their market value prior to the freeze-out, so the risk of 
overpayment is minimized. The majority shareholder can then remit 
any additional court-appraised value to the minority shareholder, 
with interest.154 
Appraisal should also be a less expensive process for minority 
shareholders. The most important reform in this regard is to grant 
courts the discretion to award successful shareholders reasonable 
attorneys’ fees (and expert fees155). Essentially, appraisal should apply 
the test courts use when awarding compound interest over simple 
interest: award attorneys’ fees when the parent fails to act in good 
faith.156 Courts should use their equitable authority to grant attorneys’ 
fees when parents have severely understated fair value. To limit 
frivolous lawsuits, however, courts should not award attorneys’ fees 
when minority shareholders lack a good faith basis for challenging the 
merger price. 
While appraisal should be more accessible to minority 
shareholders, courts should retain appraisal’s opt-in requirement and 
the initial procedures for perfecting appraisal rights. Unlike a claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty, an appraisal action does not guarantee 
that the appraised price will exceed the merger price. Though this risk 
is necessary to prevent every minority shareholder from challenging a 
freeze-outessentially, shareholders would have nothing to lose by 
an appraisal challengemany shareholders prefer to forgo the risk 
and instead accept the merger price.157 To allow these shareholders to 
 
 153. Wertheimer, supra note 21, at 640. 
 154. Courts should end the uncertainty surrounding whether simple or compound interest is 
the correct method for compensating victorious shareholders for the time value of money and 
award minority shareholders compound interest for any amount by which the appraised value 
exceeds the market price payout. It is unreasonable to assume that individual stockholders and 
institutional investors lack the financial knowledge to seek out compound interest returns. 
 155. Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802 (Del. 1992) (“It is frequently the case in 
appraisal proceedings that valuation disputes become a battle of experts.”). 
 156. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 157. In fact, courts should encourage majority shareholders to argue that the merger price 
exceeded a fair price. While appraisal should allow minority shareholders to sue when parent 
corporations or majority shareholders treat them unfairly, appraisal should also discourage suits 
when the merger price is fair. When shareholders blindly seek appraisal after a freeze-out, they 
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make an informed decision about the risk of challenging a freeze-out 
price, Delaware should continue to require strict disclosures in freeze-
out mergers.158 
C. Valuation in Appraisal 
When minority shareholders make it to the appraisal court, 
Delaware should adhere to Weinberger’s flexible valuation standard 
of using techniques widely accepted in the financial community.159 
Shareholders will likely rely on similar valuation techniques when 
they enter financial markets, and thus appraisal should compensate 
minority shareholders for the expectations they develop. Currently, 
the discounted cash flows (DCF) method of valuation is the most 
accurate valuation technique employed in the financial market.160 
Under DCF, an appraiser must estimate the continuing company’s 
future cash flows and then discount the cash flows to their present 
value using the corporation’s weighted average cost of capital 
(WAAC).161 
The underlying inquiry in valuing shares in a freeze-out is to 
determine the stockholder’s “proportionate interest in the going 
concern.”162 Although focusing on market price might seem natural 
during valuation,163 appraisal recognizes correctly that market price is 
not reliable in freeze-out mergers because the small market for 
minority shares does not permit a sufficient volume of trading to 
achieve an accurate price.164 Furthermore, freeze-outs often occur 
 
will increase the transaction costs of the merger and thus could frustrate socially beneficial 
mergers. 
 158. See supra Part I.D. 
 159. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983). 
 160. Wertheimer, supra note 21, at 627. 
 161. STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 372−73 (5th ed. 1999). See generally 
Steven N. Kaplan & Richard Ruback, The Market Price of Cash Flow Forecasts: Discounted 
Cash Flows v. the Method of Comparables, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1996, at 45. WAAC 
accounts for the corporation’s capital structure, including the cost of both equity and debt. 
ROSS, supra, at 372−73. See generally F. Modigliani & M.H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, 
Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 276–93 (1958). 
 162. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713. 
 163. Bebchuck & Kahan, supra note 91, at 4. 
 164. Wertheimer, supra note 21, at 640; see also Modigliani & Perotti, supra note 148, at 522 
(“Low demand by small investors may cause thin trading.”). In contrast, the stock market 
exception discussed in supra note 62 describes a situation when markets can support valuation 
based on market price. “The rationale of the stock market exception is that appraisal is an 
unnecessary protection for investors whose shares are traded in such well-organized, and 
presumably efficient, markets.” Stout, supra note 119, at 1286. It is important to note that the 
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when the market price is below a firm’s going-concern value as 
majority shareholders can use their private information to time 
freeze-outs.165 DCF accounts for both problems by focusing on the 
going concern’s future cash flows, not current stock price. 
DCF has several limitations, however, which courts should 
control for during an appraisal valuation. First, calculating future cash 
flows might be difficult because the majority shareholder controls the 
financial information.166 Required disclosure should alleviate much of 
this insider problem, but managers remain in the best position to 
estimate future cash flows. Second, DCF is of limited use with 
emerging corporations, which are frequent targets in freeze-out 
mergers.167 Estimating the future cash flows of these companies will 
likely either grossly understate or overstate the corporation’s value. 
Finally, DCF requires accurate estimates for each variable, and even 
slight variations in cash flows, the discount rate, or the growth rate 
will dramatically swing the corporation’s present value. 
D. Effect on Short-Form Mergers 
Finally, any appraisal reform should be tested against the 
criticism that it will impose costs on majority shareholders that are so 
large as to prevent majority shareholders from undertaking socially 
beneficial transactions.168 Any such chilling, however, would occur 
only for transactions on the margin because high value deals will close 
regardless of the protections afforded to minority shareholders.169 
Nevertheless, under the proposed Pareto approach to reforming 
appraisal in short-form mergers, the improved minority protections 
 
legislature excluded short-form mergers from the stock market exception. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 262(b)(3) (2001). 
 165. James Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder’s Appraisal Right, 77 
HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1203−04 (1964). 
 166. Wertheimer, supra note 21, at 629–30. 
 167. See O’NEAL, supra note 25, at 4 (“Squeeze-outs are most often effected in relatively 
small corporations . . . .”). 
 168. See Jon E. Abramczyk et al., Going-Private “Dilemma”?Not in Delaware, 58 BUS. 
LAW. 1351, 1365 (2003) (arguing that a proposal to hold a “limited fairness” hearing after 
freeze-out mergers would “impose costs so great on the majority stockholders that such 
stockholders would likely not propose going-private transactions in the first place”). 
 169. Cf. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 243−44 (Del. 2001) 
(recognizing that Unocal Corporation implemented procedures that it thought would satisfy 
entire fairness when freezing out the minority shareholders of its subsidiary, Unocal 
Exploration Corporation); Cannon, supra note 120, at 201 (describing Kohlberg, Kravis & 
Robert’s acquisition of Duracell, and how a $350 million original investment to take Duracell 
private returned $4.22 billion). 
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will not chill beneficial transactions. Majority shareholders can 
continue to employ Delaware’s short-form merger statute, while 
avoiding an increase in their cost of capital from the risk of 
expropriation or overreaching. 
Reforming appraisal for freeze-out mergers also raises fewer 
concerns than in some of the other contexts in which appraisal 
applies. Most acquiring groups must make a substantial investment in 
research before identifying possible target groups and corporations.170 
Such costs are irrelevant in freeze-out mergers because the acquiring 
group consists of insiders who “are inherently in possession of 
nonpublic information about their own company.”171 Similarly, 
controlling shareholders will require few resources to transition 
because they already control the corporation. Therefore, many of the 
traditional concerns about chilling efficient mergers do not apply in 
the context of freeze-out mergers. 
CONCLUSION 
In Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., the court significantly 
weakened the position of minority shareholders in a short-form 
merger by declaring that appraisal, a currently ineffective remedy, is 
the sole remedy they may seek absent fraud or illegality. Appraisal is 
ineffective because its complicated procedures and great expense 
render it unavailable for all but the largest minority shareholders. 
Most shareholders are simply better off accepting the merger terms, 
which usually impart some premium over the current market price, 
and then reinvesting the payout in a new going concern. 
Both minority and majority shareholders are aware of the 
comparative advantage majority shareholders hold. Through efficient 
markets, however, minority shareholders partially offset the 
competitive advantage with an ex ante minority discount. Although 
the minority discount serves control and liquidity purposes, it also 
includes a portion of the synergies that minority shareholders 
relinquish during appraisal. Given this interconnection, both 
shareholders and parents would be better off reducing the transaction 
costs of appraisal. 
 
 170. Peter Holl, Control Type and the Market for Corporate Control in Large U.S. 
Corporations, 25 J. INDUS. ECON. 259 (1977), reprinted in ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 
AND SECURITIES REGULATION 205–11 (Richard A. Posner & Kenneth E. Scott eds., 1980); 
Coffee, supra note 13, at 410–11. 
 171. Coffee, supra note 13, at 410. 
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Delaware should borrow from the concept of Pareto optimality 
and reform its appraisal statute to reduce the transaction costs 
involved in an appraisal action. Doing this will enable shareholders to 
bring expedient appraisal actions and receive fair value for their 
shares. If Delaware is able to make appraisal a viable alternative to 
simply accepting an unfair freeze-out price, minority shareholders will 
finally realize their proportionate share of merger synergies. 
Consequently, investors looking to buy minority interests in 
corporations will not price as large a minority discount into their 
initial purchase price, and a higher purchase price will translate to a 
lower cost of capital for the corporation. It is at this point, Pareto 
optimality, that parent corporations have the ability to execute 
quickly freeze-out mergers, shareholders receive fair value through 
an adequate remedy, and the public benefits through increased 
investment and wealth-creating mergers. 
